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The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "private
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation."' The
United States Supreme Court clearly and consistently has held that when the state
physically takes someone's property for a public purpose, the Fifth Amendment
requires that the state compensate the property owner for the value of the property
taken, even if the state takes only a portion of the property owner's "bundle of
sticks."2 The Supreme Court has been much less clear and consistent, however, in
deciding when the Fifth Amendment requires the state to compensate a property
owner whose land the state has not physically taken, but merely has regulated to
such an extent that the property owner has lost the opportunity to enjoy much of the
"economic value" associated with her property.3
In Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon,4 Justice Holmes provided the now
famous narrative description of the framework within which such regulatory takings
must be evaluated. On the one hand, he noted that "[g]overnment hardly could go
on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without
paying for every such change in the general law."5 On the other hand, he stated that
"while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking."6 Over the years the Supreme Court has done little
to refine Holmes' equation for regulatory takings, generally applying an ad hoc
balancing test which provides little in the way of predictable rules to help private
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1. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
2. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (easement for
cable wires); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (public navigation access).
3. Compare Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding that taking
occurred when coastal zone regulations prohibiting residential construction rendered property valueless),
with Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (holding that no taking occurred when
regulations preventing operation of quarry in residential district significantly reduced value of property),
and Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (holding that no taking occurred when regulation
preventing operation of brick mill in residential area diminished value of property by over 90%).
4. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
5. Id. at 413.
6. Id. at 415.
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property owners and governmental entities understand when the government has
enacted a regulation that "goes too far." Indeed, to the extent that one can extract
some guidance from the Supreme Court's regulatory takings cases, the cases appear
to suggest property owners can have some confidence that they will succeed with
a regulatory takings argument only when they can show that the challenged
regulation deprives them of all or virtually all of the economically viable use of
their property.8
Needless to say, the current state of Constitutional jurisprudence regarding
regulatory takings issues has left many individuals frustrated and dissatisfied,
particularly given that our judicial system imposes on individual property owners
the costs associated with pursuing a judicial challenge to regulations which they
believe result in an uncompensated taking of their property. As a result, many
people have shifted the forum in which they assert their grievances from the courts
to the legislatures, with nearly twenty states enacting some type of "property rights"
legislation in the last few years.' The state legislative enactments generally have
taken one of two forms - assessment statutes and compensation statutes." In
addition, Congress currently is considering several pieces of "property rights"
legislation." This article describes and evaluates these various legislative efforts
to solve the regulatory takings riddle.
To provide a framework for analyzing the state and federal legislative efforts,
section I of the article summarizes the Supreme Court's regulatory takings
jurisprudence and highlights some of the problems and unanswered questions that
plague the Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence. Section II of the article outlines
the general structure of the state assessment and compensation statutes and evaluates
the benefits and shortcomings of the various assessment and compensation statutes.
Section III of the article outlines the provisions of the most widely accepted
Congressional "property rights" proposal and highlights some of the benefits and
shortcomings of this proposal. Section IV concludes with some reflections on why
the regulatory takings riddle likely will continue to remain unsolved in spite of all
these legislative efforts.
7. The Court articulated the ad hoc balancing test in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York,
438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978).
8. The "categorical rule" the Supreme Court adopted in Lucas, one of the few cases in which the
Supreme Court has found that a regulatory taking had occurred, applies only when a regulation destroys
all economically viable use of property such that the property is rendered valueless. Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
9. See infra notes 46, 59 and accompanying text.
10. The difference Letween assessment statutes and compensation statutes is discussed infra at notes
46-109 and accompanying text.
11. In March, the House of Representatives passed the Private Property Protection Act of 1995, H.R.
925, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1994); see 141 CONG. REc. H2629 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1995). The Senate
has several different bills addressing the protection of property rights under consideration. House Bill




L The Supreme Court's Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence
Any effort to summarize the Supreme Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence in
a few short paragraphs results in over-simplification. For the purposes of providing
an analytical framework against which to evaluate the extent to which the various
legislative proposals discussed below provide a meaningful adjustment to the
balance of power between the government and private property owners, however,
an over-simplified summary of the Supreme Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence
should suffice.
When determining whether a regulation results in a taking, the Supreme Court
generally has applied an ad hoc balancing test in which it focuses its attention on
whether the regulation serves a legitimate state interest and whether it interferes
with a property owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations regarding the
lawful uses of the property."2 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that
regulations that preclude a noxious use, which could have been prohibited under
common law nuisance, do not result in a taking. 3 The Supreme Court also has
held that regulations that generally restrict use of land for the general benefit of the
public, with all affected property owners enjoying an "average reciprocity of
advantage," do not result in a taking because they do not impose on a few property
owners burdens that should be borne by the public at large. 4 Because the Supreme
Court generally has used the property owner's entire parcel of property as the
denominator in calculating the extent to which a regulation impacts a property
owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations, the Supreme Court generally has
held that regulations that affect only a portion of property do not significantly
interfere with the property owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations. 5
As the composition of the Supreme Court became more conservative under the
Reagan and Bush Administrations, some expected that the Supreme Court finally
would begin to decide regulatory takings cases in a way that offered property
owners greater protection against government intrusion. The Supreme Court did
make some effort to balance the scales slightly more in favor of the landowner in
its decision in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles. 7 In First English, the Court ruled that, even when a state rescinds a
regulation found to accomplish a taking, the state nonetheless must compensate the
12. See, e.g., Agins v. Town of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp, Co. v. City
of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978).
13. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (prohibiting excavation in
residential area); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (prohibiting brick manufacturing in
residential area).
14. See, e.g., Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 134-35.
15. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987); Agins,
447 U.S. at 261; Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123-24.
16. See, e.g., David Sive, High Court is at a Crossroads on Takings, NAYL L.J., Apr. 13, 1992, at
17. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
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property owner for the diminishment in value suffered during the period in which
the regulation was in effect."s
The Supreme Court's most recent opportunity to rebalance the scales in favor
of property owners by providing a clearer definition of when a regulation results
in a taking came with its decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.9
Lucas concerned a challenge to South Carolina's Beachfront Management Act
("the Act"), which prevented Lucas from constructing any permanent habitable
structures on his lots. The South Carolina trial court concluded that a taking had
occurred requiring the state to compensate Lucas because the Act deprived Lucas
of "any reasonable economic use of the lots" and rendered Lucas's property
valueless.' The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision.
Applying what it understood to be the applicable law with respect to regulatory
takings, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that because Lucas conceded that
the Act constituted a lawful exercise of the state's police power, designed "to
prevent serious public harm," the state need not compensate Lucas, regardless of
the Act's impact on the value of Lucas's property.2'
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court reversed the holding of the
South Carolina Supreme Court, rejecting the argument that a regulation will not
trigger the need for compensation whenever the legislature has determined that
the regulation serves a valid public purpose. Instead, the Court created a new
"categorical rule," holding that a regulation that prohibits all economically
beneficial use of land will require compensation unless the "background principles
of the State's law of property and nuisance already" constrain the rights attendant
to land ownership, such that the property owner had no reasonable expectation to
use the property in the manner prohibited under the regulation."2
A. Unanswered Questions
Although many expected that the Lucas decision would provide the Supreme
Court with an opportunity to solve the regulatory takings riddle, the Supreme
Court's Lucas decision provided property owners and governmental entities alike
18. Id. at 318-21. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in First English, a property owner who
succeeded in challenging a regulation as a taking was not guaranteed any compensation as the
governmental entity simply could rescind the regulation in question. The government thus had little
economic incentive to avoid overreaching in promulgating and enforcing regulations prior to First
English, because the only "cost" associated with excessive regulation was the possible transaction cost
involved in litigating the iegulatory takings issue (which the government was likely to win anyway).
19. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
20. Id. at 1009.
21. Id. at 1010.
22. Id. at 1029. The Supreme Court remanded the case to allow the South Carolina Supreme Court
to determine whether the Act's restrictions were inherent in Lucas's title by virtue of background
principles of South Carolina's law of property and nuisance. The South Carolina Supreme Court
concluded that the Act resulted in a taking because the constraints on land use encompassed in the Act
were not grounded in background principles of South Carolina's property and nuisance law. Lucas v.




little in the way of additional guidance regarding when regulations "go too far."
As a result, many questions remain unanswered.
1. How Does the Court Define the Affected Property?
Several scholars have noted that Lucas raises a question regarding the definition
of the property affected by a regulation.' These scholars note that prior to
Lucas, the Court traditionally viewed the entire parcel as the denominator in
evaluating whether a regulation resulted in a taking by depriving the owner of
reasonable investment-backed expectations.' Because Lucas involved the
somewhat unique factual situation in which the Act was held to render all of
Lucas's property completely valueless, the Lucas decision did not provide the
Court with a significant opportunity to stray from this traditional approach.
Nonetheless, these scholars have highlighted Justice Scalia's statement in Lucas
that the "'deprivation of all economically feasible use' rule does not make clear
the 'property interest' against which the loss of value is to be measured."' Since
deciding Lucas, however, the Supreme Court reiterated its focus on the whole
parcel in Concrete Pipe and Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers
Pension Trust.6 One cannot overstate the importance of the "denominator" in
the regulatory takings equation. If a regulation's impact on the economic value
of a parcel of property always is measured against the value of the whole parcel,
including that portion of the parcel not impacted by the regulation, there will be
few instances in which property owners will be able to demonstrate that a
regulation has "gone too far" in diminishing the property owner's reasonable
investment-backed expectations."
2. Does Lucas's "Background Principles" Concept Apply Only as an Excep-
tion to the Categorical Rule (In Complete Loss of Value Cases) or as a
More General Basis for Understanding a Property Owner's Reasonable
Investment-Backed Expectations?
Even if the Court does not alter its approach to defining the "affected parcel,"
Justice Scalia's "background principles" exception to the categorical rule arguably
could be used to support a taking claim even when a regulation only diminishes
23. See, e.g., William W. Fisher III, The Trouble with Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1393 (1993);
William Funk, Revolution or Restatement? Awaiting Answers to Lucas' Unanswered Questions, 23
ENVTL. L. 891 (1993); John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18
COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 1 (1993) [hereinafter Evolving Thresholds]; John A. Humbach, "Taking" the
Imperial Judiciary Seriously: Segmenting Property Interests and Judicial Revision of Legislative
Judgments, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 771 (1993) [hereinafter 'Taking" the Imperial Judiciary Seriously].
24. See, e.g., 'Taking" the Imperial Judiciary Seriously, supra note 23, at 796 (citing Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497-502 (1987)).
25. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7, cited in Fisher, supra note 23, at 1402-03; Funk, supra note 23,
at 894-95; Evolving Thresholds, supra note 23, at 22.
26. 113 S. Ct. 2264, 2291 (1993).
27. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 491; Agins v. Town of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261
(1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978); Goldblatt v. Town
of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
19951
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the value of a parcel of property, rather than completely negating the economical-
ly viable uses of the parcel of property. The Supreme Court held in Lucas that
even when its categorical rule applies because a regulation precludes all
economically beneficial use, compensation may not be required if the constraint
on property use contained in a challenged regulation is encompassed within
"background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance.""8
The "background principles" exception is premised on the notion that a
regulation that renders property valueless cannot result in a taking if it merely
precludes uses of the property that the property owner could not have reasonably
expected to enjoy under "background principles of the State's law of property and
nuisance."'29 Although the Court discussed the "background principles" concept
as an exception to the categorical rule it set forth in Lucas, there is no reason why
the Court could not turn the "background principles" concept around and
incorporate it into its general framework for evaluating a property owner's
reasonable investment-backed expectations in situations in which the Court applies
Penn Central's ad hoc balancing test, rather than Lucas's categorical rule. Thus,
even under Penn Central's ad hoc balancing test, the Court could view a
regulation as a taking of some portion of the owner's "bundle of rights," and
could require compensation, even though the regulation does not destroy all
economically beneficial use of the property, if the regulation precludes uses of
property that the property owner reasonably could have expected to enjoy because
the uses were not prohibited under the "background principles of the State's law
of property and nuisance."3
3. What Should be Included within the "Background Principles" Concept?
The "background principles" concept, according to Justice Scalia, finds its
roots in the traditional notion of takings jurisprudence that property owners
reasonably should expect that the state may impose some limitation on the
"'bundle of rights' that they acquire when they obtain title to property."'" Some
scholars suggest that the "background principles" concept encompasses the
common law of property and nuisance, taken together with statutes, regulations
and ordinances that constrain land use, because all these things impose inherent
limits on a property owner's reasonable expectations regarding her "bundle of
rights."3 These scholars take the view that a property owner should not
"reasonably expect" to make use of her property in a manner prohibited by
nuisance law, or by statutes, regulations and ordinances in existence when she
28. Lucas, 505 U.S. a,: 1029.
29. Id.
30. See Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of
Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1369, 1387-89 (1993).
31. Lucas, 505 U.S. a, 1027.
32. Stephen P. Chinn & Neil R. Shortlidge, Regulatory Takings After Lucas: The Missouri Nuisance
Exception, 50 J. Mo. BAR 213, 216-17 (1994); Funk, supra note 23. at 896-98; Evolving Thresholds,




receives her property.33 This understanding of the "background principles" that
limit a property owner's "bundle of rights" suggests that a regulation will result
in a taking only if 1) it is enacted after someone acquires title, and 2) it impairs
the economic value of the property by imposing restrictions on land use that did
not inhere in the property owner's title at the time she received the property in
question by virtue of the common law of property and nuisance and existing
statutes, regulations, and ordinances.
These same scholars and others have noted, however, that the language the
Court used in defining the "background principles" concept suggests that the
Court may view the inherent limits on a property owner's "bundle of rights" more
narrowly, focusing solely on the extent to which the common law of nuisance
restricts the "bundle of rights."' This narrower interpretation of the "background
principles" concept finds its roots both in Justice Scalia's specific reference to
"background principles of the State's law of properly and nuisance," and in his
distrust of state legislatures, which he assumes will identify some public purpose
to justify any regulation.35 More importantly, because this narrower interpretation
of the "background principles" concept focuses solely on judicial interpretations
of what constitutes a nuisance, legislative efforts to "correct" or "supplement" the
common law of nuisance through statutes, regulations and ordinances may not be
protected under the "background principles" concept. 6 This narrower understand-
ing of the "background principles" concept, therefore, suggests that a regulation
will result in a taking whenever it imposes restrictions on land use that 1) impair
the value of property and 2) do not inhere in the property owner's title at the time
she received the property in question by virtue of the common law of nuisance.
Some scholars have noted, however, that even the narrower interpretation of the
"background principles" concept may be broader than the above discussion
suggests because common law public nuisance claims include claims arising when
a property owner's conduct violates a statute or ordinance enacted pursuant to a
state's police powers.37 Moreover, the "background principles" of property law
may include the public trust doctrine, which may place inherent limits on a
property owner's "bundle of rights" such that a challenged regulation that merely
expands on restrictions imposed under the public trust doctrine would not result
in a taking.38
33. Funk, supra note 23, at 896-98; Evolving Thresholds, supra note 23, at 17-20.
34. Chinn & Shortlidge, supra note 31, at 216; Epstein, supra note 30, at 1389; Funk, supra note
23, at 898-99; Evolving Thresholds, supra note 23, at 23-28.
35. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1025-26 n.12 (emphasis added); see Fisher, supra note 23, at 1407-09; Funk,
supra note 23, at 897-99; Evolving Thresholds, supra note 23, at 23-28.
36. Evolving Thresholds, supra note 23, at 23-28.
37. Funk, supra note 23, at 897-99; Evolving Thresholds, supra note 23, at 11-22.
38. Paul Sarahan, Wetlands Protection Post-Lucas: Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine on
Takings Analysis, 13 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 537 (1994); Funk, supra note 23, at 899.
1995]
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B. Takings and Transaction Cost Problems
One of the major problems associated with regulatory takings concerns the
government's ability to take advantage of its superior bargaining position given
the "balance of power" between the government and the owner of land impacted
by a regulation. Recognizing that bargaining occurs within the shadow of the
law,39 and that our legal system imposes on the landowner seeking to assert a
compensation claim or to challenge a compensation award the transaction costs
associated with such a lawsuit, the government has the power and ability with
respect to physical takings claims to offer a slightly discounted compensation
award, because the transaction costs associated with challenging such an award
likely will exceed the amount of any additional recovery, even if the challenger
is successful.
In the context of regulatory takings this "balance of power" concern manifests
itself slightly differently, and possibly even more perversely. Affected property
owners not only have to incur and absorb the transactions costs associated with
contesting legislation or regulations which they believe result in a regulatory
taking, they also have little likelihood of success on the merits given the rare
circumstances in which the Supreme Court has found that regulatory takings
occur.4" As a result, federal and state legislatures and agencies arguably do not
face a significant "check" against efforts to regulate land use in a way that may
significantly impair property values.
Indeed, over the last couple of decades, while environmental statutes and
regulations increasingly have resulted in significant constraints on the ways in
which property owners may use their land, sometimes requiring that property
owners leave some portion of their land in its natural state,"' the courts generally
have provided little relief for affected property owners seeking compensation
through a regulatory takings challenge. 2
39. Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic
Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982).
40. Compare Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedietis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987) (finding
no taking); Agins v. Town of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,261 (1980) (same); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City
of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978) (same); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590
(1962) (same) with Luca, v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (holding that
taking occurred when regulation rendered property valueless).
41. See, e.g., Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 360-61 (9th Cir. 1990), affd on
remand, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 407 (1995) (holding that because the Clean
Water Act's section 404 dredge and fill permit program applies to adjacent and isolated wetlands, the
landowner may not alter wetlands without complying with permit requirements); Communities for a
Greater Or. v. Babbitt, 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2416-18 (1995) (holding that the Endangered Species Act
prohibits significant habitat modification that could harm a listed species).
42. See, e.g., Marks v. United States, 34 Cl. Ct. 387 (1995); Tabb Lakes, Inc. v. United States, 10
F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding that application of wetlands regulations did not result in a taking).
But see Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding a taking where




It should not come as a great surprise, therefore, that the "property rights"
movement has shifted much of its focus onto the state legislatures and Congress
in its effort to find a fair resolution to the regulatory takings riddle and to
establish a new balance between the power of government and the rights of
property owners.43 This effort has resulted in "property rights" legislation being
debated in the halls of virtually every statehouse and in the halls of Congress. In
the last three years, approximately twenty state legislatures have enacted some
type of "property rights" legislation, which generally takes one of two forms -
an assessment statute or a compensation statute.44 In the last year, Congress has
had several "property rights" bills offered for debate.45 The following sections
of the article discuss the various state assessment and compensation statutes, as
well as the most noteworthy of the Congressional proposals, placing specific
emphasis on evaluating the benefits and shortcomings of the statutes and
proposals in light of the unanswered questions and transaction cost problems
associated with the current state of regulatory takings jurisprudence.
I. State Property Rights Legislation
A. Assessment Statutes
Assessment statutes represent the most common form of "property rights"
legislation states have enacted to date.' In general, assessment statutes direct the
43. In his seminal article of almost 30 years ago, Professor Michelman suggested that legislatures
may need to be involved in the compensation problem because of institutional inadequacies that hamper
the ability of courts to promote fair results. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, Fairness: Comments
on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1245-55 (1967).
44. See infra notes 46-58 and accompanying text (discussing assessment statutes). See infra notes
59-109 and accompanying text (discussing compensation statutes).
45. For example, several Senators introduced property rights bills in the 104th Congress, including
Sen. Bob Dole (R.-Kan.), Senate Bill 22, Sen. Orrin Hatch (R.-Utah), Senate Bill 135 and Senate Bill
605, Sen. Phil Gramm (R.-Tex.), Senate Bill 145, and Sen. Don Nickles (R.-Okla.) and Sen. Richard
Shelby (R.-Ala.), Senate Bill 239. They subsequently consolidated their efforts into cosponsorship of an
omnibus property rights bill, Senate Bill 605. Republican Senators Release Far Reaching Property Rights
Bill, INSIDE EPA's ENvTL. POL'Y ALERT, Mar. 29, 1995, at 46-47. In addition, Representative Canady
introduced House Bill 925, which is discussed infra at notes 110-20 and accompanying text.
46. Eleven states have enacted assessment statutes: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 605 (1994); IDAHO
CODE § 67-8001 to -8003 (1995); IND. CODE § 4-22-2-32 (1994); Private Property Protection Act of
1995, ch. 170, 1995 Kan. Sess. Laws 563; MO. REv. STAT. § 536.017 (1994); Private Property
Assessment Act of 1995, ch. 462, 1995 Mont. Laws 2230; Act of Apr. 4, 1995, ch. 312, 1995 N.D. Laws
916; Act of May 9, 1994, ch. 924, 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts 846; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34a-1 to -4
(1994); W. VA. CODE § 22-IA-3 (1995); WYo. STAT. § 9-5-302 (1995). In addition, three states have
passed bills or resolutions calling for study of the regulatory takings problem. Arizona passed a bill
creating a "joint legislative study committee on the constitutional regulation of private real property" to
study "potential legal and administrative procedures necessary to secure the constitutional rights of real
property owners against governmental intrusion." ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-500.13 (1995). Arizona
previously had enacted an assessment statute, but the statute was defeated in a referendum vote in 1994.
See Dennis Vaguer, 'War' In Wings As Voters Reject Property-Rights Issue, PHOENIX GAZE'rE, Nov.
9, 1994, at Al (reporting that Arizona voters shot down Proposition 300, a referendum on the Arizona
assessment statute). Virginia passed a joint resolution calling for a legislative study of the "property
1995]
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state attorney general, or agencies generally, to evaluate whether proposed rules
or regulations result in a taking before the rules or regulations can take effect.47
1. The Impact of Assessment Statutes on Unanswered Questions
Notably, with the exception of the North Dakota statute, which is discussed
below, none of the assessment statutes address any of the unanswered questions
relating to regulatory takings jurisprudence, because each of the statutes defines
a taking by reference to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution."8 Thus, the legislatures in states with "assessment" statutes
generally have incorporated into their statutes the United States Supreme Court's
much-maligned takings formula with all the unanswered questions that come with
it.
One notable exception arises with respect to North Dakota's statute, which
provides as follows
'Regulatory taking' means a taking of real property through the
exercise of the police and regulatory powers of the state which
reduces the value of the real property by more than fifty percent.
However, the exercise of a police or regulatory power does not effect
a taking if it substantially advances legitimate state interests, does not
deny an owner economically viable use of the owner's land, or is in
accordance with applicable state or federal law.49
At first blush this statutory language seems to diverge from the Constitutional
jurisprudence regarding regulatory takings by creating a threshold of fifty percent
diminution in value for determining whether a regulation accomplishes a taking.
Because the legislature framed the exceptions in the disjunctive, however, it
arguably created a set of exceptions that swallow the rule. So few regulations
would appear to be subject to the fifty percent threshold that it is hard to imagine
that the fifty percent threshold has any continuing relevance."
rights" issue as it relates to state legislation and regulation. 1994 Va. H.J.R. 526, 1994-95 Reg. Sess.
South Dakota similarly passed a concurrent resolution calling for a rebalancing of "the need to protect
the environment and to protect the rights of landowners." S.D. Sen. Conc. Res. 10, 70th Leg., 1995 Reg.
Sess. Only five states have enacted compensation statutes. See infra notes 59-109 and accompanying
text.
47. The Delaware, Indiana, Montana and Tennessee statutes direct the attorney general to assess
whether proposed rules or regulations will result in a taking. The Idaho, Kansas, Missouri, North Dakota,
Utah, West Virginia and Wyoming statutes direct agencies to assess whether proposed rules or
regulations will result in a taking, with some states specifically directing that the attorney general provide
the guidelines for agenck s to use in conducting the assessments.
48. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 605 (1994); IDAHO CODE § 67-8001 to -8003 (1995);
Private Property Protection Act of 1995, ch. 170, 1995 Kan. Sess. Laws 563.
49. Act of Apr. 4, 1995, § 3, ch. 312, 1995 N.D. Laws 916, 917.
50. Based on a conversation with Commissioner Sarah Vogel of the North Dakota Department of
Agriculture, this language appears to be the result of a political compromise designed to allow both sides
of the property rights battle to claim victory. Conversation with Commissioner Sarah Vogel at American




2. Impact of Assessment Statutes on Balance of Power Problems
a) Public Awareness
Even though the assessment statutes may contribute little to the resolution of
the unanswered questions of regulatory takings jurisprudence, the assessment
statutes generally do make some contribution toward rectifying the "abuse of
power" problem which tempts federal and state legislatures and agencies
considering proposed legislation or regulations that may benefit the community
at large at the expense of a handful of adversely affected property owners. By
forcing state attorneys general or state agencies to consider whether proposed
rules or regulations result in a taking, frequently through a process that invites
public awareness, the legislatures enacting assessment statutes have imposed at
least a small check on the state agencies' ability to promulgate regulations that
significantly impair property rights without providing compensation."
How much of a check? Given that the assessment statutes generally require
agencies to perform assessments based on the Constitutional jurisprudence
regarding regulatory takings, for all the reasons discussed previously, the
assessment statutes are unlikely to generate assessments that indicate that a
proposed regulation constitutes a taking. Moreover, when one takes into account
1) that one of the statutes expressly provides that citizens may not bring suit over
non-compliance with the assessment process," 2) that one statute makes it clear
that the only issue for judicial review is whether the attorney general "reviewed
the rule or regulation and has informed the issuing agency in writing,"53 and 3)
that most of the other statutes do not speak expressly to the question of the
consequences of noncompliance with the assessment process,' it becomes clear
that the assessment statutes provide property owners only a nominal shield to
protect against regulatory takings and almost no sword with which to fight
regulatory takings. In sum, the assessment statutes generally do not make it much
more difficult for state agencies to promulgate regulations that significantly impair
property rights. State agencies generally retain all of their preexisting ability to
promulgate rules or regulations that significantly impair property rights with little
risk that a court will require compensation. The assessment statutes simply make
it more likely that state agencies may be less aggressive in pursuing regulatory
excesses given the potential political pressure that may result from the public
awareness of the assessment process.
51. Although many of the assessment statutes require the attorney general or the agency to make
a public report of some type, several statutes fail to provide any specific means for public dissemination
of the results of the assessment.
52. IDAHO CODE § 67-8003(3) (1995) (stating that "[n]othing in this section grants a person a right
to seek judicial relief requiring compliance with the provisions of this chapter").
53. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 605(a) (1994).
54. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 4-22-2-32 (1994); Private Property Protection Act of 1995, ch. 170, 1995
Kan. Sess. Laws 563; Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.017 (1994); Act of Apr. 4, 1995, ch. 312, 1995 N.D. Laws
916; Act of May 9, 1994, ch. 924, 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts 846; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34a-I to -4
(1994); W. VA. CODE § 22-IA-3 (1995); Wyo. STAT. § 9-5-302 (1995).
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b) Consideration qf Alternatives
Some statutes do contain specific language, however, that may provide some
additional checks on abuse of power by state agencies. Several statutes specifi-
cally require that the assessment include a consideration of alternatives to the
proposed action that would reduce the impact on property owners." In addition,
the North Dakota statute specifically requires that the agency "explain why no
alternative action is available that would achieve the agency's goals while
reducing the impact on private property owners" and "[c]ertify that the benefits
of the proposed rule exceed the estimated compensation costs.""
c) Fee-Shifting
Two states have adjusted the "balance of power" by enacting "fee-shifting"
statutes that authorize or require the payment of attorneys fees to an owner of
private property who successfully establishes that a government action constitutes
an unconstitutional taking of such owner's private property." On the one hand,
the fee-shifting language arguably provides some incentive for state agencies to
proceed with caution when promulgating regulations that may significantly impair
property rights because landowners have an added incentive to challenge
regulations. On the other hand, the extent to which the fee-shifting language
creates a meaningful incentive remains colored by the Constitutional jurisprudence
regarding regulatory takings, under which few landowners are likely to be
successful in their regulatory takings challenges.
d) Conclusion
In many respects, the assessment statutes provide a framework reminiscent of
the National Environmental Policy Act." The assessment statutes do impose
procedural obligations which may influence agency decision-making, but because
the assessments generally are based on existing regulatory takings jurisprudence
and because the assessment statutes do not provide a party with an. opportunity
to seek judicial review on the merits of the assessment, the assessment statutes
likely will not influence agency decision making to a significant degree.
B. Compensation Statutes
Five states have enacted "compensation" statutes - statutes that expressly
describe circumstances in which state agencies must compensate property owners
55. Private Property Assessment Act of 1995, § 5(3), ch. 462, 1995 Mont. Laws 2230, 2232; UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-34a-1 to -4 (1994); W. VA. CODE § 22-lA-3 (1995); Wyo. STAT. § 9-5-302 (1995).
Montana also has an Environmental Policy Act which the legislature amended to require consideration
of a regulation's impact on private property owners. Act of Apr. 11, 1995, ch. 352, 1995 Mont. Laws
1130.
56. Act of Apr. 4, 1995, §§ l(c), (0, 1995 N.D. Laws 916, 916.
57. Private Property Frotection Act of 1995, § 9, ch. 170, 1995 Kan. Sess. Laws 563, 566 (stating
that court may award fees to successful owner); Act of May 9, 1994, § 6, ch. 924, 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts
846, 847 (stating that court shall award fees to successful owner).




because of regulatory constraints that impair property values. 9 Three states,
Louisiana, Mississippi and North Carolina, have enacted subject-specific stat-




The North Carolina statute' provides little in the way of new insights into
regulatory takings. The statute simply provides that a property owner who
believes that North Carolina's efforts to conserve the marine and estuarine
resources of the State have deprived the property owner of her or his "rights in
land under navigable waters" or her or his "right of fishery in navigable waters"
may file a complaint seeking compensation for the "taking."'63 The statute makes
little effort to answer the unanswered questions described previously. Although
it arguably defines the affected property interest - rights in land under navigable
waters or right of fishery in navigable waters - it does not define expressly the
threshold for determining when such interests are taken. Accordingly, it would
appear that the North Carolina courts should continue to use the Constitutional
jurisprudence regarding regulatory takings, with all of its muddiness and
uncertainty, as the framework for assessing whether compensation is required.
b) Louisiana
The Louisiana statute, by contrast, does offer insights into ways in which a
state legislature can try to answer some of the unanswered questions and readjust
the balance of power between the government and property owners. As a first
step toward adjusting the balance of power between the government and property
owners, the statute contains an assessment component much like many of those
59. Bert J. Harris, Jr. Private Property Rights Protection Act of 1995, ch. 95-181, 1995 Fla. Laws
1651; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3:3602-3624 (West 1995); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 49-33-1 to -17 (1995);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-206 (1994); Act of June 12, 1995, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 517; Private
Property Regulatory Fairness Act of 1995, ch. 98, 1995 Wash. Laws 360.
60. Louisiana Right to Farm Law, 1995 La. Acts ch. 302 (farming and forestry); Miss. CODE ANN.
§§ 49-33-1 to -17 (1995) (fanning and forestry); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-206 (1994) (land under
navigable waters or fishing rights in navigable waters).
61. Bert J. Harris, Jr. Private Property Rights Protection Act of 1995, ch. 95-181, 1995 Fla. Laws
1651; Act of June 12, 1995, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 517. In addition, Washington enacted a draconian
compensation statute in 1995, the Private Property Regulatory Fairness Act of 1995, ch. 98, 1995 Wash.
Laws 360, which essentially contained a zero loss compensation threshold - any regulation that results
in any reduction in value regarding any portion of a parcel of property would have triggered a
compensation obligation. The voters rejected the statute, however, by a 60%-40% margin in a referendum
in November 1995. Rob Taylor, The Voters Soundly Reject R-48, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov.
8, 1995, at Al (reporting that Washington voters soundly rejected what would have been the nation's
broadest law to force government to compensate for actions that diminish value of property).
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-206 (1994).
63. Id. § 113-206(e).
64. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3:3601-3624 (West 1995).
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discussed previously ' In addition, however, the statute expressly answers some
of the questions left unanswered by the Constitutional jurisprudence regarding
regulatory takings.
(1) Affected Property and Threshold for Compensation
For example, the statute expressly provides that in deciding whether a govern-
ment action' results in a taking, the court must look at the impact of the action
on the "affected portion of any parcel" of agricultural land or "any portion" of
forest land,67 a departure from the Supreme Court's general use of the entire
parcel as the denominator for evaluating the impact of a regulation on a property
owner.68 Similarly, the statute establishes the takings threshold by requiring
compensation any time government action diminishes the fair market value or the
economically viable use of the affected portion of a parcel of property by twenty
percent or more.69
(2) Background Principles
The Louisiana statute also makes some effort to answer the "background
principles" question, as it provides that "[t]he owner of the affected private
agricultural property shall show that the diminution in value did not result from
a restriction or. prohibition of a use of the private agricultural property that was
not a use already prohibited by law."70 How this language will be applied
remains to be seen. Because the statute does not focus expressly on the common
law, the statute would appear to recognize that statutes, regulations, and
ordinances also inform a decision regarding whether a new regulation or
government action diminishes value. But the statute offers no express guidance
about whether "already prohibited by law" means at the time someone acquired
property or at the time a given regulation was promulgated. Because the assess-
65. Id. §§ 3608-09, 3522.1. The assessment provisions require the consideration of alternatives to
the proposed action "that would lessen or eliminate any adverse impact" on agricultural or forest land.
Id. §§ 3609(7), 3622.1(7).
66. The statute defines government action to include "the issuance of a rule, regulation, policy, or
guideline promulgated for or by any governmental entity, or an order or other legally binding directive."
Id. §§ 3602(12), 3622(3). The statute expressly excludes legislative statutes and resolutions and court
orders from the definition of government action. Id. §§ 3602(12)(b), (c), 3622(3)(d), (e). The statute
further provides that it shall not apply "to any governmental action where the purpose of the said
governmental action is the regulation of agriculture or the regulation of agricultural activity by a
governmental entity charged with the responsibility of promotion, protection, and advancement of
agriculture." Id. § 3612(C).
67. Id. §§ 3602(11), 3621(6).
68. See supra notes 2 3-27 and accompanying text.
69. ld. §§ 3602(11), 3622(6). Consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in First English Church
v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987), the statute provides the governmental entity a choice
of compensating the landowner or rescinding the regulation and compensating the landowner solely for
the diminishment in value during the period in which the regulation was in effect. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 3610.F (West 1995).
70. Id. § 3610(A). As noted supra at note 66, however, the statute also does not apply to certain




ment provision requires an analysis of "[w]hether the proposed governmental
action restricts or prohibits a use which is already prohibited by existing law,"'
however, one could infer that "already prohibited by law" means at the time an
agency promulgates or implements a given regulation rather than at the time the
property owner acquired title to the property.
(3) Other Efforts to Adjust Balance of Power
In addition to these adjustments to the balance of power, the Louisiana statute
also imposes two other checks on government action. First, it gives the impacted
agricultural property owner, but not the owner of forest land, the choice of
retaining title and receiving compensation for the diminishment in value, or
transferring the land to the government for its preregulation fair market value.72"
Second, it authorizes the court to award attorneys fees to the prevailing party.73
c) Mississippi
The Mississippi statute74 likewise offers insights into ways in which a state
legislature can try to answer some of the unanswered questions and readjust the
balance of power between the government and property owners. The Mississippi
statute mirrors the Louisiana statute in that it applies only to agriculture and forest
land.75 Unlike the Louisiana statute, it does not contain any language requiring
that agencies perform takings assessments prior to promulgating rules and
regulations. Like the Louisiana statute, however, the Mississippi statute does
contain language that answers expressly some of the questions left unanswered
by the Constitutional jurisprudence regarding regulatory takings.
(1) Affected Property and Threshold for Compensation
For example, the Mississippi statute, like the Louisiana statute, departs from the
Supreme Court's general use of the entire parcel as the denominator for evaluating
the impact of a regulation on a property owner by providing that in determining
whether an action of the State of Mississippi" requires compensation, the court
71. Id. § 3609(B)(6).
72. Id. § 3610(D). The statute also expressly encourages parties to disputes regarding agricultural
land, but not regarding forest land, to pursue mediation, and even authorizes the court to order the parties
to attempt mediation "at any point in the proceedings prior to trial." Id. § 3610(C).
73. Id. §§ 3610(E), 3623(D)-(E). Notably, this attorneys fees language is something of a double-
edged sword for landowners and governmental entities alike. This may serve to minimize the extent to
which the statute prompts litigation because both landowners and governmental entities may be more
willing to resolve disputes without litigation in cases in which their arguments are questionable rather
than risk incurring the other party's attorneys fees should the other party prevail in litigation.
74. MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 49-33-1 to -17 (1995).
75. Id. § 49-33-3. Notably, as originally enacted in 1994, the statute applied only to forest land.
Mississippi Forestry Activity Act, ch. 647, 1994 Miss. Laws 1308. The statute was amended in 1995 to
incorporate agricultural land as well. Mississippi Agricultural and Forestry Activity Act, ch. 379, 1995
Miss. Laws 200.
76. The statute defines the State of Mississippi to include the state and any political subdivision of
the state. MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-33-7G) (1995).
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must look at the impact of the action on the "fair market value of forest or
agricultural land (or any part or parcel thereof)."" Similarly, the statute
expressly establishes the takings threshold by requiring compensation any time
action by the State of Mississippi reduces the fair market value of the affected
portion of a parcel of property "by more than forty percent (40%) of [its] value
before the action.""
(2) Background Principles
The Mississippi statute also makes some effort to answer the "background
principles" question, as it provides that compensation is not required with respect
to an action under the state's police power "to prohibit activities that are noxious
in fact or are harmful to the public health and safety." 9 Similarly, the statute
does not require compensation with respect to an order issued as a result of a
violation of any existing statute, rule, regulation, ordinance, resolution, or similar
action, "as interpreted on the effective date of the act.' 0 This language suggests
that action taken to abate a nuisance or to enforce a rule or regulation in effect
as of the effective date of the statute will not trigger a regulatory taking, but
actions to enforce subsequently promulgated rules or regulations, or actions that
implement a changed interpretation of an existing rule or regulation may trigger
a taking. Thus, an owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations are based
on the state of the common, statutory, and regulatory law on the effective date of
the compensation statute, not simply on the state of the common law at the time
the property owner received title.
(3) Other Efforts to Adjust Balance of Power
In addition to these adjustments to the balance of power, the Mississippi statute
also imposes one other check on government action, as it authorizes the court to
award to the landowner the costs of litigation, including attorneys fees, if the
governmental entity rescinds the regulation subsequent to the filing of the action
and prior to a decision becoming final.8 '
77. Id. § 49-33-7(h).
78. Il Consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in First English Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987), the statute provides the governmental entity a choice of compensating the
landowner or rescinding the regulation and compensating the landowner only for the diminishment in
value during the period in which the regulation was in effect provided that the rescission occurs before
a decision in an action becomes final. MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-33-9(2) (1995). Notably, however, if the
governmental entity fails to rescind the regulation until after a decision becomes final the rescission will
not affect the state's obligation to compensate the affected property owner pursuant to the decision.
79. Id. § 49-33-7(e)(ii). The statute specifically provides that public health and safety regulations
that prohibit or severely restrict agricultural or forestry activities must (1) respond "to real and substantial
threats to public health and safety," (2) be designed "to significantly advance the health and safety
purpose," and (3) be "[n]o greater than necessary to achieve the health and safety purpose." Id. § 49-33-
7(i).
80. Id. §§ 49-33-7(e)(iii), -7(k).
81. Id. § 49-33-9(2). Oddly, although the statute expressly states that the landowner is entitled to




2. Statutes of General Application
a) Texas
The Texas statute" also offers many insights into ways in which a state
legislature can try to answer some of the unanswered questions and readjust the
balance of power between the government and property owners. The Texas statute
contains an assessment provision which requires the attorney general to prepare
guidelines to assist political subdivisions in evaluating actions that may result in
a taking and requires political subdivisions to conduct such assessments prior to
providing public notice of the proposed government action. 3 The assessment
must include a consideration of alternatives. The statute also makes it clear that
a political subdivision's failure to perform an assessment renders void any
government action for which the statute requires a takings assessment.'
(1) Affected Property and Threshold for Compensation
Much like the Louisiana and Mississippi statutes, the Texas statute sets a
precise threshold for determining when a regulation accomplishes a taking. It
provides that a taking occurs when a government action "is the producing cause
of a reduction of at least 25 percent in the market value of the affected private
real property.""5 Notably, however, unlike the Louisiana and Mississippi statutes,
the Texas statute does not clearly depart from the Supreme Court's general use
of the entire parcel as the denominator for evaluating the impact of a regulation
on a property owner." It is not clear whether "affected private real property"
means the portion of property affected by the regulation or the affected property
taken as a whole. 7
becoming final, it does not clearly provide that the landowner generally is entitled to recover the costs
of litigation, including attorneys fees, if the landowner prevails in an action.
82. TEx. Govr CODE ANN. § 2007 (1995).
83. Id. § 2007.041-.043. The statute defines a government action to include, among other things,
"(1) ... an ordinance, rule, regulatory requirement, resolution, policy, guideline, or similar measure;
[and] (2) an action that imposes a physical invasion or requires a dedication or exaction of private real
property." Id. § 2007.003. The statute contains several express exclusions from the definition of
government action, including most municipal regulations and "action taken to prohibit or restrict a
condition or use of private real property if the government entity proves that the condition or use
constitutes a public or private nuisance as defined by background principles of nuisance and property law
of this state." Id. § 2007.003(b)(1), (6).
84. Id. § 2007.044.
85. Id. § 2007.002(5). The statute specifically entitles a prevailing landowner only to have the
governmental action invalidated, id. § 2007.023(b), although it provides the governmental entity the
option of compensating the landowner rather than invalidating the action in question. Id. § 2007.024(c)-
(d). Notably, the statute does not follow the logic of the Supreme Court's First English decision, as it
does not require the governmental entity to compensate for the diminution in value during the period in
which an invalidated governmental action was in effect.
86. See supra notes 67, 77 and accompanying text.
87. Id. § 2007.002(5).
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(2) Background Principles
The Texas statute also makes some effort to answer the "background principles"
question, as it excludes from the definition of government action efforts to
preclude nuisances," and further provides that a property owner may not pursue
a lawsuit or an administrative hearing with respect "to the enforcement or
implementation of a statute, ordinance, order, rule, regulation, requirement,
resolution, policy, guideline, or similar measure that was in effect on September
1, 1995," and that prevents the pollution of a sole source aquifer."'
(3) Other Efforts to Adjust Balance of Power
The Texas statute also imposes an additional check on government action by
requiring the court to award attorneys fees to prevailing parties."
b) Florida
In the Bert J. Harris Private Property Rights Protection Act," the Florida
legislature recognized "that some laws, regulations, and ordinances of the state
and political entities in the state, as applied, may inordinately burden, restrict, or
limit private property rights without amounting to a taking under the State
Constitution or the United States Constitution."' Believing that protecting
private property owners from such inordinate burdens constitutes an important
state interest, the Florida legislature created "a separate and distinct cause of
action from the law of takings," to provide "relief, or payment of compensation,
when a new law, rule, regulation, or ordinance of the state or a political entity in
the state, as applied, unfairly affects real property."93 Specifically, the Florida
statute provides that a property owner is entitled to relief "[w]hen a specific
action of a governmental entity has inordinately burdened an existing use of real
property or a vested right to a specific use of real property." '
(1) Affected Property and Threshold for Compensation
Notably, the Florida statute does not define the threshold for compensation with
the same exactitude as the Louisiana statute, for example. Instead, the statute
88. kd. § 2007.003(b).
89. Id. § 2007.004(c).
90. Id. § 2007.026. See supra note 73.
91. Ch. 95-181, 1995 Fla. Laws 1651.
92. Id. § (1).
93. Id.
94. Id. § (2). The statute defines an "existing use" as
an actual, present use or activity on the real property.... or such reasonably foreseeable,
nonspeculative land uses which are suitable for the subject real property and compatible
with adjacent land uses and which have created an existing fair market value in the
property greater th:m the actual, present use or activity on the real property.
Id. § (3)(b). The statute provides that "vested rights" are defined "by applying the principles of equitable





contains a narrative description of the circumstances in which a property owner
is entitled to relief.
The terms 'inordinate burden' and 'inordinately burdened' mean that an
action of one or more governmental entities has directly restricted or
limited the use of real property such that the property owner is
permanently unable to attain the reasonable, investment-backed
expectation for the existing use of the real property or a vested right
to a specific use of the real property with respect to the property as
a whole, or that the property owner is left with existing or vested uses
that are unreasonable such that the property owner bears permanently
a disproportionate share of a burden imposed for the good of the
public, which in fairness should be borne by the public at large."'
Although this language in many respects reflects some of the muddy language the
Supreme Court has used in trying to define when regulations "go too far," the
purpose clause of the statute makes it clear that the Florida legislature designed
the "inordinate burden" threshold to facilitate relief for property owners in
circumstances in which relief might not be available under the state and federal
constitutions.96 Nonetheless, because the Florida statute directs courts to consider
the impact of the government action "with respect to the real property as a
whole,"97 it appears to follow the current Supreme Court approach of evaluating
whether a taking has occurred by looking at the extent to which the regulation
diminishes the value of the property owner's entire interest in land."
(2) Background Principles
The statute also makes a fairly clear effort to address the "background
principles" issue, as it does not apply to "impacts to real property occasioned by
government" efforts to address a public nuisance at common law or a noxious use
of private property." In addition, it does not apply "to the application of any law
enacted on or before the date of adjournment ... of the 1995 Regular Session of
the Legislature, or as to the application of any rule, regulation, or ordinance
adopted, or formally noticed for adoption, on or before that date."1" Similar to
the Mississippi statute, therefore, the Florida statute suggests that actions taken
to enforce preexisting rules and regulations do not trigger regulatory takings,
while actions taken to implement rules and regulations adopted subsequent to the
conclusion of the 1995 legislative session may trigger a regulatory taking.
95. Id. § (3)(e).
96. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. The statute also expressly states that it "provides
a cause of action for governmental actions that may not rise to the level of a taking under the State
Constitution or the United States Constitution." Id. § (9).
97. Id. § (3)(e).
98. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
99. Id. § (3)(e).
100. Id. § (12).
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(3) Other Efforts to Adjust Balance of Power
The most interesting and distinctive aspect of the Florida statute, however,
concerns the innovative dispute resolution procedure the Florida legislature
created to facilitate an equitable resolution of property rights disputes."0 ' The
statute requires that a property owner seeking compensation for allegedly
inordinate burdens arising from some government action must present a claim to
the agency(ies) responsible for the action more than 180 days prior to commenc-
ing suit. The claim must include "a bona fide, valid appraisal that supports the
claim and demonstrates the loss in fair market value to the property."'" During
the 180-day notice period, which the parties can agree to extend, the statute
requires that "the government entity shall make a written settlement offer to
effectuate" one or more of several approaches to resolving the differences
between the property owner's interest in using her land and the government
entity's interest in protecting the public interest reflected in the rule, regulation or
ordinance that gave rise to the dispute." The legislature specifically anticipated
that this dispute resolution process may trigger creative results that exceed or
contradict statutory authority. To address this possibility, the statute provides for
the parties to bring an action in circuit court to obtain approval of an agreement
that "would have the effect of contravening the application of a statute as it would
otherwise apply to the subject real property ... to ensure that the relief granted
protects the public interest served by the statute at issue and is the appropriate
relief necessary to prevent the governmental regulatory effort from inordinately
burdening the real property.""
If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, the statute directs the
government entity to "issue a written ripeness decision identifying the allowable
uses to which the property may be put," which constitutes the last prerequisite to
judicial review."' The statute further provides that "[i]f the property owner
rejects the settlement offer and the ripeness decision of the governmental entity
or entities, the property owner may file a claim for compensation."" The statute
states: "The circuit court shall determine whether an existing use of the real
property or a vested right to a specific use of the real property existed, and, if so,
whether, considering the settlement offer and ripeness decision, the governmental
entity or entities have inordinately burdened the real property.""'
If the court determines that the government entity has inordinately burdened the
claimant's property, the statute directs the court to award compensation
101. Id. §§ (4)-(6).
102. Id. § (4)(a).
103. Id. § (4)(c).
104. Id. § (4)(d)(2).
105. Id. § (5)(a). Tl-e statute provides that the dispute will be ripe for judicial action, regardless of
the existence of other administrative remedies, following the issuance of the ripeness decision, or at the
conclusion of the 180-day notice period if the government entity fails to issue a ripeness decision, Id.
106. Id. § (5)(b).




determined by calculating the difference in fair market value of the
real property, as it existed at the time of the governmental action at
issue, as though the owner had the ability to attain the reasonable
investment-backed expectation .... and the fair market value of the
real property, as it existed at the time of the government action at
issue, as inordinately burdened, considering the settlement offer
together with the ripeness decision, of the governmental entity.'
Notably, the statute provides that the court may award reasonable attorneys fees
to the prevailing party, provided that such party can demonstrate that it acted in
good faith in making a settlement offer (government entity) or in rejecting a
settlement offer (property owner)."w
Ill. Proposed Federal Legislation
Although there have been a variety of legislative proposals offered in Congress
regarding property rights issues," ° this article will focus primarily on the Private
Property Protection Act of 1995, as that is the only proposal that has been
approved by one of the two houses of Congress."' House Bill 925 contains a
very broad purpose statement in section 2(a), providing that "[i]t is the policy of
the Federal Government that no law or agency action should limit the use of
privately owned property so as to diminish its value..". Section 2(b) provides
that "[e]ach Federal agency, officer, and employee should exercise Federal
authority to ensure that agency action will not limit the use of privately owned
property so as to diminish its value."".
House Bill 925 actually applies expressly to a much narrower range of
government activity, however, as it applies only to agency action "under specified
regulatory law." House Bill 925 defines specified regulatory law as follows:
(A) section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33
U.S.C. § 1344);
(B) the Endangered Species Act of 1979 (16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.);
(C) title XII of the Food Security Act of 1985 (16 U.S.C. § 3821
et seq.); or
(D) with respect to an owner's right to use or receive water only
[the Reclamation Acts, the Federal Land Policy Management Act, and
section 6 of the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning
Act of 1974]."'
108. Id. § (6)(b).
109. Id. § (6)(c). See supra note 73.
110. See supra note 45.
111. H.R. 925, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The House of Representatives passed the Private
Property Protection Act of 1995 on March 3, 1995. 141 CONG. REc. H2629 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1995).
112. H.R. 925, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(a) (1995).
113. Id. § 2(b).
114. Id. § 9(5).
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In essence, therefore, House Bill 925 applies only (1) to wetlands regulations
under the Clean Water Act and the Swampbuster provisions of the Food Security
Act of 1985, (2) to habitat restrictions under the Endangered Species Act, and (3)
to various restrictions on rights to use or receive water.
A. Affected Property and Threshold for Compensation
House Bill 925 answers both the affected property question and the threshold
for compensation question. House Bill 925 provides as follows: "The Federal
Government shall compensate an owner of property whose use of any portion of
that property has been limited by an agency action, under a specified regulatory




With respect to the background principles issue, House Bill 925 essentially
adopts Justice Scalia's nuisance exception from Lucas with a slight gloss. House
Bill 925 provides that "no compensation shall be made under this Act with respect
to a limitation on" a use that is defined as a nuisance "by the law of a State or
is already prohibited under a local zoning ordinance.....6 It further provides that
action primarily intended to prevent a hazard to public health or safety or an
action related to a navigation servitude will not trigger a compensation obligation
except to the extent that the navigation servitude applies to wetlands."'
Notably, this language suggests that preexisting statutory or regulatory
constraints relating to wetlands or endangered species habitat do not constitute
part of the "background principles" that shape everyone's understanding of a
property owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations, except to the extent
that they are encompassed within a state's nuisance law or a municipality's zoning
ordinance, neither of which is likely. This could mean that property owners who
purchased property knowing that it was subject to wetlands restrictions nonethe-
less could receive compensation under House Bill 925, were it to become law,
whenever agency action under the applicable wetlands restrictions diminishes the
fair market value of the wetlands portion of their property by more than 20
percent. Although this certainly constitutes one way .to adjust the "balance of
power" between the government and private property owners, one could argue that
it shifts the balance too much in favor of property owners (1) whose land may not
be significantly impacted, and (2) who may not be able to assert in good faith that
they had a reasonable expectation regarding their right to use the property in the
manner restricted.
115. Id. § 3(a).
116. ld. § 4.




C. Other Efforts to Adjust Balance of Power
House Bill 925 imposes on federal agencies a notice obligation. Specifically,
House Bill 925 states that "[w]henever an agency takes an agency action limiting
the use of private property, the agency shall give appropriate notice to the owners
of that property explaining their rights under this Act and the procedures directly
affected for obtaining any compensation that may be due to them under this
Act.".. House Bill 925 also imposes a notice obligation on property owners.
"An owner seeking compensation under this Act shall make a written request for
compensation to the agency whose agency action resulted in the limitation. No
such request may be made later than 180 days after the owner receives actfal
notice of that agency action.'. 9 House Bill 925 also gives property owners a
choice to pursue relief through arbitration or a lawsuit, and provides that property
owners who prevail in an arbitration or a civil action "shall be entitled to ... a
reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs (including appraisal fees)."''
IV. Conclusion
The regulatory takings riddle has puzzled courts, commentators, governments,
and property owners for decades. Although many scholars have offered critiques
of the Supreme Court's decisions and occasionally proposed solutions to the
regulatory takings riddle,' the Court has not been quick to embrace the
proposed solutions.
Justice Brandeis wrote that states should serve as laboratories in which social
experimentation can occur for the good of the nation." Many state legislatures
have decided to take Justice Brandeis at his word by enacting an array of
assessment and compensation statutes that will enable them to experiment in the
search for the appropriate balance between government power to regulate land use
and property owners' rights to enjoy the use of their land or receive compensation
for -significant restrictions on the use of their land.
118. Id. § 8.
119. Id. § 6(a).
120. Id. § 6(e). Notably, because House Bill 925 does not allow the prevailing party to recover
attorneys fees, the government would not be able to recover its attorneys fees were it to prevail in an
action brought under House Bill 925.
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Most of the assessment statutes provide little in the way of meaningful
experimentation. Although the assessment requirement marks a small adjustment
in the balance between government power and the rights of property owners, the
adjustment is hardly significant given that the statutes generally direct agencies
or attorneys general to base their assessments on the existing Constitutional
jurisprudence regarding regulatory takings.
The compensation statutes on the other hand, show some significant experimen-
tation, particularly with respect to the Florida and Texas statutes. Each of these
statutes makes a concerted effort to adjust the balance of power between the
government and private property owners by imposing compensation obligations
in circumstances in which the Constitution, as presently interpreted, would not
require compensation. Whether these statutes provide an appropriate balance
remains to be seen. The Texas statute may provide a meaningful comparison
with its twenty-five percent diminishment invalidation/compensation threshold,
especially given that the diminishment in value appears to be judged against the
value of the property as a whole. The Florida statute, even though it provides the
least precision in tenns of defining the compensation threshold, may provide the
most meaningful lessons, as its dispute resolution procedures provide property
owners with a. great opportunity to have their concerns heard and addressed
without negating the government's ability to develop an appropriate system of
land use regulations to address legitimate public concerns.
As the Supreme Court continues to struggle to define when a given regulation
"goes too far," you can anticipate that state legislatures and Congress will
continue in their efforts to solve the regulatory takings riddle. These continuing
efforts to find a workable balance between government power to regulate land use
and the rights of private property owners to enjoy the use of their land should be
the subject of fruitful analysis for years to come.
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